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EVALUATION OF A COMPUTER SIMULATION TO ASSESS
SUBJECT PREFERENCE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF
INCENTIVE PAY: PART TWO

Stephen Mark Sundby, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1995

This study further investigated the use of a computer simulation to assess
subject preference for different types of pay systems. Subjects were eight
undergraduates recruited from psychology classes at Western Michigan University.
The dependent variable was the subjects’ choice of pay system, either simulated
hourly pay or base pay plus incentive. Simulated work performance was
determined by the computer with 0.50 probability of low or high performance. For
Experiment 1, the independent variable was the maximum amount of simulated pay
that subjects could earn under each pay type. For Experiments 2 and 3, the
independent variable was the percentage of simulated expenses relative to total
expected simulated pay. The simulated expense conditions were 85% and 95% of
total pay for Experiment 2 and 50% and 100% of total pay for Experiment 3.
Every four simulated weeks, subjects paid simulated expenses. There were four
phases for each session. The adequacy of the simulation was assessed by
examining the stability of subjects’ choices. The manipulation of simulated pay
amounts controlled subjects’ responding in Experiment 1, with all subjects
selecting the pay type with the greater payoff. The simulated expense conditions
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in Experiments 2 and 3 did not control subjects’ responses. These data suggest
that overall, subjects did not prefer one pay type over the other.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Pay-for-Performance Systems

Monetary incentive or pay-for-performance systems are those in which a
worker’s compensation is in some way determined by his/her productivity. The
concept of pay-for-performance is not new. Although monetary incentives have
probably been used for millennia, Frederick Taylor and his "scientific
management" popularized pay-for-performance systems in the 1900s (Locke,
1982). Taylor, after observing a steel worker with excess energy after work,
wondered if there was a way to increase the productivity of all workers. He
reasoned that workers would put forth a greater effort on the job if their
compensation was based on their productivity and in the 1920s convinced several
employers to try monetary incentive plans. Studies in laboratory and actual work
settings (reviewed by, Farr, 1976; Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985; Locke, 1982;
Orpen, 1982; Terborg & Miller, 1978; Weinstein & Holzbach, 1973) have
repeatedly confirmed that performance can be substantially increased with the use
of monetary incentives.
The use of pay-for-performance systems became common early in this
century, but its popularity eventually declined (Locke, 1982). The decline in

1
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popularity of pay-for-performance systems has been attributed to the onset of the
human relations movement. The human relations movement was brought about
principally by a group of studies conducted from 1927 through 1932 at the
Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric company located in Cicero, Illinois
(Landy, 1989). Elton Mayo, a major figure in these studies, was an ardent
opponent of scientific management and introduced the concept o f human relations
as a substitute for Taylor’s scientific management (Landy, 1989). This movement,
still popular today, looks to such areas as interpersonal communication, work
motivation, and social environment for answers to productivity problems (Landy,
1989). Interestingly, in a recent analysis of the Hawthorne Studies, Parsons
(1992), contends that the development of objective measures and contingent pay
could account for the increase in productivity observed in those studies.
In recent years, the use o f pay-for-performance systems in organizations has
regained some popularity (McAdams & Hawk, 1992; O ’Dell, 1986). Some experts
believe this is due to a worsening world economy (Blinder, 1990; Lawler, 1990).
Many organizations, concerned with an increasingly competitive marketplace, have
turned to pay-for-performance systems as a means of increasing worker
productivity. Research interest in such programs has emphasized not only
productivity, but job satisfaction as well. Interest in job satisfaction is predicted on
the assumption that satisfaction affects, or at least covaries with behaviors
associated with productivity or profitability such as absenteeism, and turnover
(Cotton & Tuttle, 1986; Weiner, 1980), prounion voting behavior (Heneman &
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Sandver, 1983), and extra-role behaviors (Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987).
Some authors have argued that we have a moral obligation to investigate issues of
equity in compensation (e. g., Mawhinney, 1984) and pay continues to be an
important issue with employees (Heneman, 1985; Lawler, 1971). The importance
of pay systems to employees may, in part, explain the increased interest in
determining the factors associated with pay satisfaction or "preference" (e.g.,
Heneman, 1985; Lawler 1981).

Traditional Pay Satisfaction Research

Much of the research associated with pay satisfaction has been concerned
with understanding the types of comparisons people make when evaluating
alternative pay systems. One popular theory used to guide research investigating
job satisfaction is discrepancy theory (Locke, 1969). According to Locke (1969, p.
316), "Job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are a function of the perceived
relationship between what one wants from one’s job and what one perceives it as
offering or entailing." Locke (1969) contends that three elements influence
satisfaction: (1) the perception o f some aspect of the job, (2) an implicit or explicit
value standard, and (3) a conscious or subconscious judgment of the relationship
between one’s perception(s) and one(s) value(s). An important distinction Locke
(1969) makes is between the concept of what one "values" and what one "needs."
"A value is that which a man actually seeks to gain and/or considers beneficial"
(Locke, 1969, p. 320). Values are objects or events that a person desires, wants,
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or seeks to obtain. In contrast, "needs" are those things that organisms biologically
must have to maintain their physical health and survival, such as food and water.
The distinction is an important one to Locke (1969), because what one "values"
may or may not meet the "needs" of an organism, yet it is what one "values" that
governs "emotional responding." For example, when applied to satisfaction with
compensation or pay, individuals would (a) have some perception of the amount of
their compensation, (b) some perception of the amount they should be earning, and
(c) a judgement of the relationship (discrepancy) between their compensation and
the amount they perceive they should be earning.
Berger, Olson, and Boudreau (1983) tested Locke’s (1969, 1976)
discrepancy model by investigating the effects of unions on several facets of job
satisfaction, among them pay satisfaction. They used multiple regression and logit
analyses to analyze data from a national sample of 1455 adults who were working
at least 20 hours a week. Berger and colleagues (1983) concluded that unions do
not have a direct effect on pay satisfaction. However, they (Berger et al., 1983)
concluded that unions had an indirect effect on pay satisfaction and "on average,
union members are more satisfied with their pay because they place greater value
on pay outcomes, and because they receive more pay outcomes in the form of both
direct pay and fringe benefits" (Berger et al., 1983, p. 304). In other words, the
high "value" placed on compensation held by union members may be the primary
variable associated with their pay satisfaction. They select union jobs due to the
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higher pay (Lewis, 1984), and then receive greater compensation and thus are more
satisfied with their pay.
In a replication of the Berger el al. (1983) study, Evans and Ondrack
(1990), also concluded that there is a relationship between unionization and
satisfaction with pay. They surveyed 1193 fully employed, male, blue-collar
workers about their satisfaction with the job itself and with pay. As in the Berger
et al., (1983) study, they found no relationship between union status and the actual
work performed. However, even after controlling for such variables as hours
worked and demographics, they (Evans & Ondrack, 1990) found union status was
associated with pay satisfaction.
Rice, Phillips, and McFarlin (1990) tested the multiple discrepancies
hypothesis, an extension of Locke’s discrepancy model, as it relates to pay
satisfaction. In their words, "This hypothesis proposes that pay satisfaction is
determined by an appraisal process in which actual salary is compared
simultaneously with several standards of comparison" (Rice et al., 1990, p. 386).
They measured (a) pay satisfaction, (b) current salary, (c) four personnel standards
of comparison, and (d) demographics in a mail survey of 169 mental health
professionals. They found that the correlation between the combined discrepancyrelated variables and the four standard measures of comparison was significantly
greater than the correlation between the discrepancy-related variables and any
single comparison. Rice et al. (1990) concluded from their results that individuals

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6
use multiple comparisons in determining their subjective satisfaction with pay as
opposed to a single comparison.
"Equity Theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) adds the dimension of justice within a
social comparison framework in relation to referent others" to discrepancy theory
(Huber, Seybolt, & Venemon, 1992, p 1357). In Adam’s Equity Theory (1963,
1965) pay satisfaction is proposed to be determined by individuals comparing their
amount of compensation with that of their peers. For example, if a person
compared his/her compensation with that of peers doing the same or similar work
and determined that he/she were the lowest paid worker, this may be perceived by
the worker as not being "equitable," resulting in lower satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the pay system. Systems in which compensation is fairly
"balanced" across workers would be perceived as more satisfactory or "equitable."
Lawler (1971) believed that discrepancy theory and equity theory did not
completely explain how individuals determine satisfaction with pay. Lawler (1971)
proposed a revised discrepancy model that addresses the issue of pay satisfaction
by combining traditional discrepancy theory and equity theory. A key feature of
Lawler’s revised discrepancy model is that people not only compare their
compensation with that of others, but also consider their inputs in association with
their outputs when considering the equality of their compensation. For example, if
a worker’s perception was that they were performing at a higher level than fellow
workers, yet receiving less compensation, they may be dissatisfied with their pay.
However, if their perception is that they are receiving a comparable amount of
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compensation as others, based on their relative inputs (performance), they may be
satisfied with the system.
Using this model, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1984) assessed empirically the
relationship between the presence or absence of a faculty union and the level of
faculty pay satisfaction in a nonunion and a union university system. They used
five items from the pay scale o f the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire along
with four questions designed to measure (a) satisfaction with benefits, (b) future
pay expectations, (c) cost of living adjustments, and (d) the way pay raises were
given. Their results indicated that the presence of a faculty union is positively
associated with pay satisfaction, after controlling for several correlates of pay
satisfaction. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1984) determined that unions moderate the
relationship between gender and pay satisfaction. While there was no difference in
satisfaction between the sexes in a nonunion system, women were more satisfied
with their pay than males in the union system. They speculated that the union
environment tends to reduce gender differences in pay, making the system more
equitable. Further, they found that untenured faculty members were more satisfied
with their pay in both union and nonunion systems than tenured faculty. While
they are unclear of the cause of this phenomenon, they speculated that it was the
result of a "wage compression effect," in which the compensation of new
untenured faculty rises faster than that of older, tenured members, who may be
near the top of the pay scale. Further, they speculate that in many cases tenured
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members are more "locked" into the system, with less professional mobility, which
may reduce their job satisfaction.
Huber, Seybolt, and Venemon (1992) examined the relationship between
individual inputs and perceptual variables on four facets of pay satisfaction. They
examined (1) the effects of actual pay on pay satisfaction, (2) the effects of
individual inputs on pay satisfaction, (3) the effects of perceptual variables on pay
satisfaction, and (4) the moderating effects of pay level. Three hundred and one
university faculty members were surveyed using the Pay Satisfaction Scale
(Heneman & Schwab, 1979). Huber et al. (1992, p. 1368) reported that,
consistent with the revised discrepancy model of pay satisfaction (Dyer &
Theriault, 1976; Lawler, 1981), perceptual variables were strongly
associated with pay level satisfaction (37.3%). Reinforcing earlier findings
(Heneman et al., 1988), contingent pay was the most important determinant
of pay level satisfaction.
They concluded, "from a practical perspective, the results of this study suggest that
establishing a pay-for-performance compensation system may be the most effective
way to promote pay satisfaction" (p. 1370).
A fundamental tenet of all discrepancy theories is that job satisfaction is
influenced by a comparison of actual and referent characteristics of employment.
Goodman (1974) theorized that people use multiple referents in determining their
satisfaction with pay. He established three classes of referents: (1) other, (2)
system, and (3) self. Individuals are using the first class of referent, "other," when
they compare their pay with that of someone else. This may be someone holding
the same position within specific boundaries, but is not limited to that comparison.
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For example, workers may compare their compensation with that of someone
working alongside of them, or they may make comparisons with "others" doing
similar work in another department or organization. A "system" referent is used
when the workers are comparing their pay with expectations resulting from being a
member of the system. For example, if a company has always given a merit pay
increase every year in conjunction with a cost of living adjustment, individuals
come to expect that pay adjustment. However, if the company were to withhold
the merit pay increase, then satisfaction with pay may change as a result of a
system action. "Self" referents are those comparisons that are unique to the
individual. For example, if workers were to compare their present job performance
and compensation with a previously held level of job performance and
compensation, and determined that they previously made more money for less
output, they may not find their current pay as satisfying. Goodman (1974) further
contents that within each of these classes there are different categories of referents,
such as other-inside, when a person makes a comparison to someone inside certain
boundaries, and other-outside, when referring to an individual from outside the
boundaries. In testing these propositions, Goodman (1974) surveyed 217 managers
from a single firm using a 3-hour interview, a questionnaire, and company records.
In general, Goodman’s (1974) results support the position that people use multiple
referents in establishing pay satisfaction. This finding is consistent with the
subsequent conclusions of Rice et al. (1990).
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Summers and DeNisi (1990), reexamined five of Goodman’s (1974) six
hypotheses. Using different measures and a different sample, they supported
Goodman’s (1974) findings that (a) other, system, and self classes of referents are
significantly associated with pay satisfaction; (b) perceived balances between ones
input/output with others exhibit stronger associations with pay than objective
measures such as pay level; and (c) as people move up the professional ladder they
are more likely to select referents outside the focal organization. These findings
tend to support equity theory as proposed by Adams (1965).
Lee and Martin (1991) looked at internal and external referents as
predictors of pay satisfaction among employees in a two-tier wage setting. A twotier wage setting is one in which employees are hired at a lower pay than
previously hired employees. Lee and Martin (1991) hypothesized that equity
theory, in which workers compare their inputs and outcomes against others’ inputs
and outcomes in determining pay satisfaction, and relative deprivation theory, in
which a state of deprivation resulting from these comparisons between the
outcomes they receive and those of another group, help explain pay satisfaction.
Lee and Martin (1991) used a five-point Likert-type response scale to investigate
868 retail food chain workers’ satisfaction with pay relative to four internal
referents: (1) high-tier employers, (2) low-tier employers, (3) full-time workers,
and (4) part-time workers. Four external referents were also examined: (1) those
working in heavy industry, (2) those in fast food industry, (3) those at other places
where the respondent might obtain work, and (4) those working for competitors.
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Statistical analyses were performed using MANOVA. Results suggest that
employees make comparisons with similar status referents to help determine the
amount of equity and to higher status referents to determine the amount of
deprivation.
Taylor and Vest (1992) investigated the extent to which public sector
employees make particular pay comparisons and the impact of (a) external, (b)
personal, (c) economic, and (d) ego referents on pay satisfaction. Two hundred
and twenty-four blue-collar and white-collar municipal employees from a variety of
departments were surveyed. Taylor and Vest (1992) concluded that comparisons
made to external referents tend to reduce pay satisfaction, while personal
comparisons tend to increase pay satisfaction.
Blau (1994) tested whether level and importance of a pay referent interact
to affect pay level satisfaction. "Level" refers to a respondents’ comparison of
pay, to referents on some quantitative scale, such as a Likert. "Importance" deals
with the subjects’ perceived importance of the referent. Blau (1994) tested the
hypotheses that (a) there will be a significant positive relationship between level of
each pay referent and employee pay satisfaction, (b) there will be a significant
negative relationship between importance of each pay referent and employee pay
satisfaction, and (c) there will be a significant interaction in level and importance
of a pay referent in determining pay satisfaction. The pay referents used were (a)
financial, (b) historical, (c) organizational, (d) market, and (e) social. The Job
Descriptive Index (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969), Minnesota Satisfaction
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Questionnaire (Weiss, Dawis, England, & Lofquist, 1967), and the Pay Satisfaction
Questionnaire (Heneman & Schwab, 1985) were used to analyze the pay
satisfaction of 162 pharmaceutical managers. Blau (1994) found that level and
importance of pay referents interact to affect pay level satisfaction. In other
words, the managers’ reported pay level relative to others and the importance given
to the referent (other) interacted to establish the manager’s perceived pay
satisfaction. This finding is consistent with other research suggesting that level
and importance of pay referents interact to affect satisfaction (Rice, Gentile, &
McFarlin, 1991; Summers & Hendrix, 1991).
While several theory-driven researchers have examined the role of referents
in determining job satisfaction, others have investigated the role of specific
organizational policies and procedures. For example, providing (or failing to
provide) information about company-wide pay scales may affect satisfaction. In a
survey evaluating the referents used by managers to determine job satisfaction,
Blau (1994) found that:
[mjanagers who perceived that the market and organization referents were
important and they had a lower level than these referents were dissatisfied.
Conversations with pharmaceutical Human Resource personnel indicated
that the organization’s pay policies were not "open" to employees. In a
"secret" pay policy, individuals estimate comparison others’ pay. Research
(Lawler, 1971) has found that in a secret pay system managers tend to
overestimate other managers’ pay relative to their own. Managers believing
that work comparison others within and outside the organization make more
than they do will have less organization (fairness) pay satisfaction (p.
1265).
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The importance of organizational policies and procedures is clearly evident
in procedural justice studies, an area of research that may be relevant to pay
satisfaction (Greenberg, 1987). Although distributive justice has traditionally been
the main focus of organizational researchers, procedural justice has grow as an area
of research in recent years (Greenberg, 1987). Procedural justice refers to the
perceived fairness of the system used to determine compensation, whereas
distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the amount of pay received
(Folger & Konovsky, 1989). In general, studies (e. g., Lind & Tyler, 1988;
McFarlin & Sweeny, 1992; Sweeney, Mcfarlin, 1993; Tyler & Caine, 1981) that
have examined the effects of procedural and distributive justice have found that
procedural justice is a better predictor of organizational-level attitudes and
distributive justice is a better predictor of personal-level attitudes. Procedural
justice would appear to be associated with Goodman’s (1974) concept of a system
referent. In a recent study of procedural justice, Folger and Konovsky contend that
"research in legal and political contexts has suggested that procedural justice is
more closely related to the evaluation of systems or institutional characteristics,
whereas distributive justice is more highly related to the evaluation of specific
outcomes" (1989, p. 115, italics added). For example, in a study dealing with
reactions to pay raises, Folger and Konovsky (1989) surveyed 217 employees of a
privately owned manufacturing plant to determine the effect of distributive and
procedural justice on their reactions to decisions about pay raises. They concluded
that distributive justice accounted for more of the variation in satisfaction with pay
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than procedural justice. However, Folger and Konovsky also note that "procedural
justice also makes a significant contribution to pay satisfaction" (1989, p. 125).
The results from procedural justice research suggest that when individuals perceive
the system as fair, they are more likely to be satisfied with their compensation, and
when the system is unfair, they are dissatisfied with their compensation.
In summary, the traditional survey literature suggests that people are
concerned with the perceived fairness of the payment system. Further, they make
multiple comparisons with others as to the perceived fairness and balance of the
distribution of compensation, considering both inputs and outcomes. These studies
suggest that an equitable compensation system results in employee satisfaction with
pay. As suggested by Huber et al. (1992), pay-for-performance systems when
properly designed and implemented may be the most equitable system for insuring
satisfaction with pay.

Pay-for-Performance Satisfaction Research

Few studies have examined worker satisfaction with pay-for-performance
systems. Miceli, Jung, Near, and Greenberger (1991) attempted to identify features
of pay-for-performance systems that may be associated with pay satisfaction. They
analyzed archival data from 22 public sector organizations. In general, Miceli et
al. (1991) found that (a) receipt of performance-based rewards are positively
associated with pay-system reactions, (b) endorsement of the merit pay concept and
perceptions of effort-reward consonance are significantly associated with reactions
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to the pay system, (c) external comparisons are more closely related to reactions
about salary than pay systems, and (d) variables reflecting procedural justice in the
administration of pay are positively associated with pay system reactions.
Interestingly, Miceli et al. (1991) reported that satisfaction with a pay system and
satisfaction with perceived pay earned under that system did not always covary
highly. The implication is that the predictors of pay satisfaction and pay-system
satisfaction are not the same.
Results consistent with the notion that reaction to pay systems and
perceived pay under a given system may differ were reported by Brown and Huber
(1992). They investigated the effects of a pay-for-performance system on pay
satisfaction by assessing employee responses when a traditional variable pay plan
was replaced by an earnings-at-risk plan. An important aspect of this study was
the differentiation of pay outcome satisfaction and pay process satisfaction. One
hundred one employees of a large publicly held bank were surveyed before and
after the implementation of an earnings-at-risk (EAR) incentive pay plan. Brown
and Huber (1992) concluded that negative reactions to pay outcomes were stronger
than negative reactions to general pay processes. This would suggest that the
actual amount of pay received was more salient than the process involved in
determining pay. However, in an important postscript, the authors noted:
[Bjased on the levels of employee dissatisfaction resulting from the EAR
pay plan, the bank returned to the variable pay system that had been in
place at the time of the first survey. Base pay was raised to match the
market and variable pay was administered in the form of bonuses (Brown
& Huber, 1992, p. 308).
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This quote highlights the need for employers to make sure that employees
thoroughly understand, and are satisfied with, any compensation system that is
implemented.
Pritchard and his colleagues (Pritchard, Hollenback, & DeLeo, 1980;
Pritchard, Leonard, Von Bergen, & Kirk, 1976) have discovered that exposure to
alternative pay systems can influence employee preferences. In one study
(Pritchard et al., 1976), subjects were exposed to hourly pay and three different
incentive pay arrangements. When asked to rate their satisfaction with the pay
systems on an attitudinal questionnaire, they rated the three incentive pay arrange
ments as equally attractive and the hourly pay as least attractive. However, in a
second study (Pritchard et al., 1980) in which subjects were exposed to only one of
the pay arrangements, there were no differences in satisfaction across the pay
arrangements. Further, satisfaction ratings altered with exposure; that is, daily
satisfaction ratings were significantly different on the first versus the fifth day of
exposure to the pay arrangements, leading the researchers to conclude that evalua
tions of such pay arrangements must only occur after subjects have experience
working under them. Therefore, in order to determine subject preference for
various payment systems, subjects should be exposed to all the relevant payment
systems. Further, they should be asked to choose their preferred system, and then
be exposed to that system.
Two factors that have been shown to affect workers’ satisfaction with payfor-performance systems are the degree to which pay is contingent upon
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performance (Cherrington, Reitz, & Scott, 1971; Greene, 1973; Gupta, 1980;
Heneman, Greenberger & Strasser, 1988; Miceli, Jung, Near, & Greenberger, 1991)
and the accuracy of the performance measurements used to determine pay (Dyer &
Theriault, 1976; Miceli et al., 1991).
In general, studies that have examined the relationship between
compensation systems and pay satisfaction have obtain conflicting results (e.g.,
Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Heneman & Schwab, 1979; Latham & Huber, 1992;
Opsahl & Dunnette, 1966; Thierry, 1984, 1987). This may, in part, result from the
use of self-report measures in determining satisfaction with pay. Social (e.g.,
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) and behavioral psychologists (e.g., Lockhart, 1979) have
found that self-report measures o f attitude are inconsistent in their ability to predict
actual behavior. Further, as concluded by Miceli et al., (1991) the predictors of
"worker satisfaction with pay" and "worker satisfaction with pay systems" are not
the same. This would reduce the usefulness of the pay satisfaction research in
determining the variables workers prefer in pay systems. As a result, little is
known about the variables that affect preference for particular pay systems.

Simulation Research

The use of simulations may prove to be a feasible alternative for
investigating the variables associated with employee/subject preference for certain
pay systems. Since manipulating compensation systems in most organizations
would be problematic (Hickson, 1963), a laboratory simulation would appear to be
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a viable alternative for studying the variables associated with pay satisfaction or
preference.
The use of a simulation that would allow for variables to be manipulated,
with subjects selecting the pay type they would like to "work" under, was
investigated by Oah (1989). Oah (1989) tested the possibility of using a board
game in a laboratory setting to assess subjects’ preference for pay systems. The
percentage of monthly expenses relative to total expected earnings, either 85% or
95%, was the independent variable. Each simulated month subjects chose 0%,
25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of their total pay to be provided in incentives. The
choice of the percentage was the dependent variable. Oah (1989) contended that if
the simulation was valid, subjects would select lower percentages of incentives in
the 95% expense condition than in the 85% condition, because they would be less
willing to put a large amount o f their pay at risk in the former condition. That is,
the higher the percentage of incentives subjects selected, the greater the risk that
they would not have enough money to pay their expenses when those expenses
constituted a high proportion of their total pay. Ten three-person groups were
exposed to various sequences o f the two expense conditions. Worker productivity
was simulated by a roll of a die, which determined the amount of simulated
weekly pay the subject would receive. A roll of 1 equalled poor performance;
rolls of 2, 3, 4, or 5 equalled average performance; and a roll of 6 equalled
excellent performance. Four rolls of the die, one roll for each simulated week,
represented the subject’s work performance for one simulated month. After one
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month, subjects were given a list of simulated monthly expenses (85% or 95%)
and paid their expenses. Once the bills were paid, subjects again selected which
payment system they would work under for the following month.
Subjects received compensation for their participation. The subject in each
group with the highest accumulated earnings received $5.00, the subject with the
second highest total received $3.00, and the subject with the lowest number
received nothing. The results revealed that the independent variable did, to some
extent, control subject selection of the percentage of incentive pay to total pay
(dependent variable). Overall, 18 of the 30 subjects demonstrated sensitivity to
manipulations of the expense condition. Ten of these 18 subjects responded as
expected by selecting lower percentages of incentive-based pay when their
expenses were high. With respect to those subjects that responded inconsistently,
Oah (1989) suggested that the competitive nature of the group environment created
by the differential payment method may have influenced responding more than the
expense condition. In an attempt to obtain higher simulated earnings than the
other group members, subjects may have selected higher incentive percentages
even though that also increased the risk of not having enough funds to cover their
expenses, particularly in the 95% expense condition. Nonetheless, the results of
this initial simulation were promising.
Sundby, Dickinson, and Michael (in press) used a computer simulation to
extend Oah’s (1989) introductory research. Aside from using a computer
simulation, the Sundby et al. (in press) study differed from the Oah (1989) study in
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3 fundamental ways. First, subject participation and compensation were on an
individual level to control for the possibility that group interactions may affect
responding. Second, there was an increased probability of excellent simulated
performance if the subject selected incentive-based pay in more than one
consecutive simulated pay period. Studies (e.g., Farr, 1976; Gaetani et al., 1985;
Locke, 1982; Orpen, 1982; Terborg & Miller, 1978; Weinstein & Holzbach, 1973)
have shown that performance usually increases under incentive-based pay systems
as opposed to time-based pay systems; therefore, the simulation was modified to
more closely resemble "real world situations." Third, upon selection of a pay
system, subjects were exposed to that system for three consecutive simulated
months, rather than one, in order to greater expose subjects to the expense
condition under that pay system and to the consequences of that selection.
As in the Oah study (1989), it was expected that subjects would be more
likely to select higher percentages of incentive-based pay when they were
"working" under the 85% expense condition in comparison to the 95% expense
condition. Although Oah (1989) reported that "the majority of subjects displayed
sensitivity to the expense manipulations and eighteen of thirty subjects responded
consistently to systematic manipulations of the expense conditions," (p.42), the
Sundby et al. (in press) study did not control responding to this extent. Only three
subjects demonstrated any control by selecting higher incentive pay percentages
under the 85% expense condition and lower incentive pay percentages under the
95% expense condition. However, initial selections (during the first phase)
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suggested that the simulated expense percentage did somewhat control the selection
of pay type. This suggests that with refinement, a simulation like that used by
Sundby et al. (in press) may be a viable way to investigate the variables that affect
preference or satisfaction with a pay system.
The purpose of the present study was to continue investigating the use of a
computer simulation to assess subject preference for different types of pay systems.
This study considered several variables that may explain the less than compelling
results from previous studies. First, this study used a dichotomous dependent
variable for all the experiments, with stable responding used to determine phase
changes. There were two pay types; hourly pay and base pay plus incentive. It
was thought that by narrowing the choices, a stable, systematic pattern of
responding would develop. Second, since we were interested in determining what
subjects prefer about pay systems rather than controlling their behavior with
monetary incentives, subjects were not compensated based on any performance
criteria. Comments made by subjects during debriefing in the Sundby et al. (in
press) study, suggest that the monetary contingencies placed on the performance of
subjects in the simulations may have resulted in random selection of pay types in
an attempt to maximize compensation for participation in the simulation. Since we
were primarily concerned with preference, rather than the established effects of
monetary incentives, subjects were compensated for completion of the study.
Therefore, their selections were not based on trying to achieve the maximum
amount of simulated savings. Third, there was a 0.5 probability of either high or
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low productivity being selected. This was done to simplify this aspect of the
simulation. Fourth, one experiment of the study was made very simple to
determine if the usual simulation was too complex for subjects. Based on subject
responses during debriefing (Sundby et al., in press), it appeared that subjects did
not fully understand the variables or interaction of variables associated with the
simulation, even though their self-report data suggested that they understood the
simulation. In order to investigate the possibility that subjects did not fully
understand the variables in the simulation, the expense condition was held constant
at 95% across all phases, while the maximum amount of simulated pay that could
be earned under each pay type, either hourly or base pay plus incentive was
manipulated. It was assumed that stable responding would be obtained under these
conditions.
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were eight volunteers (3 males, 5 females), ranging in age from 19
to 25, recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at Western Michigan
University. Subjects were required to pass a seven-question selection quiz
(Appendix A) on basic percentages and finances to participate. The quiz
determined if potential subjects understood the basic percentages and finances
necessary to perform the simulation. The study received approval from Western
Michigan University’s Human Subject Institutional Review Board (Appendix B)
before onset of the study. Informed consent was obtained in writing from subjects
prior to their inclusion in the study. A copy of the informed consent form is in
Appendix C. Subjects 1, 2, 3, and 4 received $10 for completing Experiment 1,
while Subjects 5, 6, 7, and 8 received $30 for completing Experiments 2 and 3.

Setting

Sessions were conducted in a small room, approximately 2 meters by 2
meters, located in the Behavioral Pharmacology Laboratory, Department of
Psychology, Western Michigan University.
23
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Apparatus/Materials

The apparatus consisted o f a Commodore Colt microcomputer (IBM
compatible) running a program written by the author in GW-BASIC.

Experiment 1

Four subjects (1, 2, 3, 4) participated in this study.

Simulated Work Performance

Simulated work performance was determined by the selection of a number
by the computer. Simulated work performance was categorized as low or high,
corresponding with "real world" conditions in which workers either fail to meet
criteria necessary to obtain incentives (low productivity) or meet criteria and
receive incentives (high productivity). One number represented one week’s
simulated work performance. Four weeks constituted a month.
Low and high simulated work performance was represented by the numbers
1 and 2, respectively. The computer controlled the frequency that these numbers
were selected, with a 0.50 probability of either number being chosen.

Dependent Variable

The subjects’ choice of simulated pay type, either hourly or base pay plus
incentive, was the dependent variable. At the beginning of the simulation and
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every three simulated months thereafter, subjects chose whether they would receive
hourly pay or base pay plus incentive. The computer automatically recorded the
choice of the subject.

Independent Variable

The maximum amount o f simulated pay, either $2000 or $4000, that a
subject could earn under each pay type was the independent variable for
Experiment 1. Table 1 displays the total amount of monthly pay that subjects
could receive based on the simulated pay system selected and their simulated work
performance. Total earnings equaled the total amount of money that subjects could
earn per simulated month based on the pay system selected and their simulated
work performance. The specific calculations used to arrive at the amounts in
Table 1 are contained in Appendix D.

Simulated Expenses

Every four simulated weeks subjects were required to pay simulated
expenses. At expense time, a screen would inform the subject that it was "Time to
Pay Expenses" and deduct the appropriate amount from the subject’s account and
update the financial statement screen. If there was not enough money in the
simulated savings account, then a loan was given at 20% interest. The loan was
paid back from future earnings. Expenses were 95% (Table 2) of the total
expected simulated earnings for Experiment 1.
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Table 1
Simulated Weekly Pay for Experiment 1
Pay Condition 1 (High Base Pay Plus Incentive)
Hourly Pay
Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$500

$0

$500

$12.50

High

$500

$0
$500
Base Pay Plus Incentive

$12.50

Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$900

$0

$900

$22.50

High

$200
$1100
$900
Pay Condition 2 (High Hourly)
Hourly Pay

$27.50

Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$1000

$0

$1000

$25.00

High

$1000

$0

$1000

$25.00

Base Pay Plus Incentive
Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$450

$0

$450

$11.25

High

$550

$100

$550

$13.75

Simulation

The computer simulation program was loaded by the experimenter prior to
the subject’s arrival. When the simulation was loaded, an identification number
used for data collection purposes, along with the beginning experimental condition
was entered by the experimenter. Although the computer controlled all aspects of
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Table 2
Total Amount of Monthly Expenses for Experiment 1
Pay Condition 1 (High Base Pay Plus Incentive)
Pay Type

Total Pay

95% Expense Condition

Hourly Pay

$2000

$1900

Base Pay Plus Incentive

$4000

$3800

Pay Condition 2 (High Hourly Pay)
Pay Type

Total Pay

95% Expense Condition

Hourly Pay

$4000

$3800

Base Pay Plus Incentive

$2000

$1900

the simulation, the experimenter was present during the entire session for subject
questions.
The first few screens contained the instructions for the simulation. The
subject could read the instruction file as many times as desired, by responding "y"
to the computer prompt asking if he/she would like to see the information again.
The instruction file is provided in Appendix E. Responding "n" to the prompt
started the simulation.
The subject was presented with a short demonstration of the simulation at
the start of the practice session. During this part of the simulation, the subject was
required to press a key, prompted by messages on the screen, to continue through
the simulation. Both pay types were presented during the demonstration to ensure
that the subject was familiar with the program and the pay schedules prior to
actual data collection.
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After the demonstration, the computer displayed the condition in effect for
the first phase as described in the "Independent Variable" section. The subject was
required to answer a multiple choice question at the start of each phase to
determine if the subject understood the current condition.
The subject was then prompted by the computer to select the pay type that
he/she would have in effect for the first three simulated months. The subject could
select either hourly pay or base pay plus incentive as described in the "Dependent
Variable" section.
After pay type selection, the computer determined the simulated work
performance by selecting a number that corresponded with low or high simulated
work performance. The subject’s simulated work productivity was manipulated as
described in the "Simulated Work Performance" section.
Once the computer selected the simulated performance level for the subject,
the appropriate amount of simulated pay was displayed on the financial statement
screen (Appendix F). All income was placed in a savings account for later
payment of expenses. At the end of each simulated month simulated expenses
were paid as described in the simulated expenses section above.
The financial statement screen was displayed throughout the simulation and
showed the number of the current simulated week, simulated performance for the
week, simulated pay for the week, the accumulated simulated pay for the current
phase, percentage of incentive selected, total amount of fixed expenses, total
amount of variable expenses, simulated savings amount, simulated interest on
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savings amount, simulated loan amount, and the simulated interest on loan amount.
From the financial statement screen, the subject could select to display their
expenses by pressing "e" on the keyboard, look at the pay table by pressing "p," or
continue to the next simulated week by pressing "n." If "n" was selected, then the
simulation proceeded to a transitional screen that displayed the message "Continue
to Next Week," followed by the computer repeating the procedure of selecting the
subject’s simulated performance.
The phases changed as described in the "Experimental Design" section.
When each phase change occurred, the computer reset all simulated financial
variables to zero, except the session savings amount, and displayed the current
simulated expense condition on the screen. This process continued until all phases
had been completed.
W hen the subjects completed Experiment 1, the computer displayed the
amount of money that the subject received and beeped to inform the experimenter
that the subject had completed the study. Subjects were then asked to complete a
four-question survey used to determine (1) if interactions between subjects outside
of the laboratory may have influenced responding, (2) his/her perceived
understanding of the independent variable, (3) his/her perceived understanding of
the dependent variable, and (4) whether boredom influenced their responding
(Appendix G). The experimenter then debriefed the subject and paid him/her $10
for participation.
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Experiment 2

All aspects of the simulation were the same as Experiment 1, except the
amount of simulated pay that could be earned under each pay type was held
constant at $2000 and the percentage of simulated expenses was manipulated.
Four subjects (5, 6, 7, 8) participated in Experiment 2.

Simulated Pav

Table 3 displays the total amount of weekly pay that subjects could receive
based on the simulated pay system selected and their simulated work performance
in Experiment 2. Total earnings equal the total amount of money that subjects
would earn per month based on the pay system selected. There was a 0.50
probability that a subject’s performance would be low or high for each simulated
pay condition. Thus, the total expected monthly earnings for the hourly condition
was $2000.00, (0.50 X $2000 (low performance) plus 0.50 x $2000.00 (high
performance)). The specific calculations used to arrive at these amounts are
contained in Appendix D.

Independent Variable

The independent variable, the percentage of monthly expenses relative to
total earnings, had two values for Experiment 2: 85% and 95%. These values
were used in previous studies that assessed the feasibility of using computer
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Table 3
Simulated Weekly Pay for Experiments 2 and 3
Hourly Pay
Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$500

$0

$500

$12.50

High

$500

$0

$500

$12.50

Base Pay Plus Incentive
Performance

Base Pay

Incentive Pay

Weekly Pay

Hourly Rate

Low

$375

$0

$375

$9.38

High

$375

$250

$625

$15.63

simulation to investigate subject preference of pay types (Oah, 1989; Sundby, et
al., in press). Oah (1989) selected these values based on a consumer expenditure
survey (Norwood, 1985) that revealed that urban consumers with incomes of
$20,000 to $29,000 spent approximately 96% of their annual income, while
consumers with incomes of $30,000 or more spent approximately 85% of their
annual incomes. Table 4 shows the total amount of expenses, for each expense
percentage condition, across each simulated pay condition.
Simulated expenses consisted of fixed expenses and variable expenses.
Fixed expenses remained constant at $1200 and $1500 for the 85% and 95%
expense conditions respectively. Fixed expenses consisted of housing cost,
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Table 4
Total Amount of Monthly Expenses for Experiment 2
Pay Type

Total Pay

85% Expense
Condition

95% Expense
Condition

Hourly Pay

$2000

$1700

$1900

Base Pay Plus
Incentive

$2000

$1700

$1900

transportation cost, and food cost. Variable expenses consisted of medical cost,
entertainment cost, and unexpected expenses. The variable expenses were
calculated by the computer such that the total simulated monthly expenses of
subjects would equal 85% or 95% of their total simulated monthly income. An
example of the simulated expenses for Experiment 2 are shown in Table 5.

Table 5
List of Fixed and Variable Expenses for Experiment 2
Simulated Fixed Expense
85% Expense Condition

95% Expense Condition

Housing Cost = $500

Housing Cost = $700

Food Cost = $200

Food Cost = $200

Transportation = $500

Transportation = $600
Simulated Variable Expenses ’

85% Expense Condition

95% Expense Condition

Medical Cost

Medical Cost

Entertainment

Entertainment

Unexpected Cost

Unexpected Cost

computer.
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The expense condition changed once stable responding had occurred.
Stable responding was defined as hourly pay or base pay plus bonus being selected
for four consecutive pay periods. Once all phases were completed for Experiment
2, the "End of Session" screen appeared.

Experiment 3

The subjects who participated in Experiment 2 also were used in
Experiment 3. All variables for Experiment 3 were the same as for Experiment 2,
except the expense condition values were changed to 50% and 100%. Fixed
expenses remained constant at $750 and $1500 for the 50% and 100% expense
conditions respectively. Table 6 displays the total amount of expenses for each
expense percentage condition, across each simulated pay condition. An example of
the simulated expenses for Experiment 3 are shown in Table 7.

Table 6
Total Amount of Monthly Expenses for Experiment 3
Pay Type

Total Pay

50% Expense
Condition

100% Expense
Condition

Hourly Pay

$2000

$1000

$2000

Base Pay Plus
Incentive

$2000

$1000

$2000

When the subject had completed Experiment 3, the computer displayed the
amount of money that the subject received and beeped to inform the experimenter
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Table 7
List of Fixed and Variable Expenses for Experiment 3
Simulated Fixed Expense
50% Expense Condition

100% Expense Condition

Housing Cost = $400

Housing Cost = $800

Food Cost = $150

Food Cost = $200

Transportation = $200

Transportation = $500
Simulated Variable Expenses ’

50% Expense Condition

100% Expense Condition

Medical Cost

Medical Cost

Entertainment

Entertainment

Unexpected Cost

Unexpected Cost

computer.

that the subject had completed the study. At this point, as with Experiment 1, the
subject was asked to complete a four-question survey used to determine (1) if
interactions between subjects outside of the laboratory may have influenced
responding, (2) his/her perceived understanding of the independent variable, (3)
his/her perceived understanding of the dependent variable, and (4) whether
boredom influenced their responding (Appendix G). The experimenter then
debriefed the subject and paid him/her $30 for participation.
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Experimental Design

A within-subject counterbalanced reversal design was used. For each
experiment, two subjects were exposed to an ABAB sequence and two subjects to
an BABA sequence, where A and B correspond to the experimental treatments for
each experiment. Subjects were exposed to each experimental condition until
stable responding occurred. Stable responding was defined as the same pay type
being selected for four consecutive periods. All sessions lasted approximately two
hours.
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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Subjects 1, 2, 3, and 4 completed Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, the
independent variable was the maximum amount of "simulated" pay that could be
earned under each pay type (described above). Subjects 4, 5, 6, and 7 completed
Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiments 2 and 3 the independent variable was the
expense percentage (described above). Since incentive conditions were in effect
for simulated 3-month periods, data are plotted for incentive periods, rather than
simulated months.

Experiment 1

The data for Experiment 1 are displayed in Figure 1. Subjects 1 and 2
were exposed to the High Incentive-High Hourly-High Incentive-High Hourly pay
sequence, while Subjects 3 and 4 were exposed to the High Hourly-High IncentiveHigh Hourly-High Incentive pay sequence. All subjects’ responding was
controlled by the manipulations of the maximum simulated pay amounts. Subjects
selected the pay type that offered the maximum amount of simulated pay. For
example, if hourly pay resulted in a maximum simulated pay of $4000, as
compared to $2000 for base pay plus incentive, then subjects selected hourly pay.

36
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Figure 1. Subjects’ Pay Type Selections Across Phases for Experiment 1.
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Experiment 2

The data for Experiment 2 are displayed in Figure 2. Subjects 5 and 6
were exposed to the 85%-95%-85%-95% expense sequence, while Subjects 7 and 8
were exposed to the 95%-85%-95%-85% expense sequence. The expense
conditions in Experiment 2 did not obviously control subjects’ responding. Table
8 shows the breakdown of pay system selections for each subject in Experiment 2.
These data evidence considerable variability in responding, with hourly and base
pay plus incentive being selected about equally often under both exposure
sequences for the subjects as a group. Subjects 6 and 8 consistently selected
hourly pay, while Subjects 5 and 7 selected base pay plus incentive.

Experiment 3

The data for Experiment 3 are displayed in Figure 3. Subjects 5 and 7
were exposed to the 50%-100%-50%-100% expense sequence, while Subjects 6
and 8 were exposed to the 100%-50%-100%-50% expense sequence. Table 9
shows the breakdown of pay systems selected for each subject in Experiment 3.
As in Experiment 2, there was no apparent control of responding by manipulations
of the expense percentage.
Only Subject 3 responded as hypothesized under these conditions. That
person selected hourly pay when the expense condition was 100% and base pay
plus incentive when the expense condition was 50%. The other subjects responded
with a great deal of variability and no obvious patterns were evident.
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Figure 2. Subjects’ Pay Type Selections Across Phases for Experiment 2.
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Figure 3. Subjects’ Pay Type Selections Across Phases for Experiment 3.
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Table 8
Breakdown of Pay System Selections for Experiment 2
Subjects Selections Under the 85% Expense Condition
Subjects
Pay System

5

Hourly

7

Incentive

'

6

7

8

Total

12

0

8

27

2
8
16
0
Subjects’ Selections Under the 95% Expense Condition
Subjects

26

Pay System

5

6

7

8

Total

Hourly

0

18

1

9

28

Incentive

8

3

10

0

21

Questionnaires

Subjects 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 responded correctly to all questions on the
selection quiz, while Subject 3 missed two questions (6 and 7) and Subject 4
missed one question (7). Subjects 2 and 4 were allowed to participate with less
than 100% accuracy because the experimental conditions they were exposed to in
Experiment 1 did not require a thorough understanding of percentages. All
subjects demonstrated at least rudimentary understanding of basic percentages and
finances.
All subjects responded correctly to the phase change questions presented at
the beginning of each phase, suggesting they were aware of the experimental
conditions in effect and understood how these conditions affected the simulation.
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Table 9
Breakdown of Pay System Selections for Experiment 3
Subjects’ Selections Under the 50% Expense Condition
Subjects
Pay System

5

6

7

8

Total

Hourly

10

0

1

11

22

Incentive

2
4
10
10
Subjects’ Selections Under the 100% Expense Condition
Subjects

26

Pay System

5

6

7

8

Total

Hourly

32

10

3

24

69

Incentive

31

0

13

18

62

Pertaining to the after session questionnaire, all subjects responded "no"
when asked if anyone other than the experimenters had discussed this study with
them. This suggest that they had not discussed the experimental conditions of the
study with other subjects during or prior to their participation. All subjects
responded "yes" to questions two and three, stating that they understood the
expense and incentive conditions. Only Subject 4, from Experiment 1, reported
that boredom influenced responding, although data for this subject do not support
this conclusion. Subject 4 had the same general response pattern as the other three
subjects in Experiment 1.
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Summary

In summary, the amount of maximum simulated pay available under each
pay type did control subjects’ responses in Experiment 1. Subjects selected the
pay type that resulted in the greatest amount of simulated pay. Manipulating the
expense percentages in Experiments 2 and 3 did not obviously control responding,
Subjects did not respond systematically to manipulations of the independent
variable in these studies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

This study was the third in a series of studies (Oah, 1989; Sundby et al., in
press) examining the feasibility of using a simulation to investigate factors that
may affect subject/worker preference for different types of incentive pay. My
assumption, as in previous research (Sundby et al., in press), was that
manipulations of the independent variables would control the subjects’ selection of
simulated pay type, thus demonstrating the sensitivity of the simulation. If such
control were demonstrated, it would provide two types of important information.
First, it would confirm that simulations could be used to investigate variables that
affect preference for different forms of incentive pay, providing a foundation for
further investigations using simulations. Second, the data collected may provide
some insight into factors that affect preference for certain pay types, enabling
compensation analyst to design pay systems that not only increase productivity, but
also employee satisfaction with the pay system.
The data from this study provided some important information. First, the
data from Experiment 1 demonstrated that the computer simulation is sensitive to
some independent variables. All subjects’ responding was controlled by
manipulations of the amount of simulated pay that could be earned. They selected
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the pay type that had the greater payoff. For example, when hourly pay resulted in
the greater amount of simulated pay, subjects selected the hourly pay system.
Conversely, when base pay plus incentive result in the greater amount of simulated
pay, they selected base pay plus incentive. This systematic control of responding
suggests that manipulation of variables within a simulation can control responding.
Second, the results from this study support previous research that has
shown that higher pay increases pay-level satisfaction (e.g., Fossum, 1979). These
results suggest that compensation analyst should consider the importance of paylevel when designing payment systems. According to these results, subjects select
(or prefer) the system that offers the most compensation. Moreover, the results of
this study are consistent with previous findings, because the simulation appears
useful for investigating some of the variables associated with pay system
preference or pay satisfaction.
Although manipulations o f the expense conditions in Experiments 2 and 3
did not systematically control subject responding, they provide some valuable
information. These data tend to support the conclusion that subjects did not prefer
one pay system over the other, when the maximum amount of simulated
compensation is constant across pay systems. Even when there was a major
difference between the simulated expense conditions (50% and 100%), 3 of the 4
subjects did not respond in a systematic way to the manipulations, suggesting that
the simulated expense conditions were not a salient variable in their selection of
pay type. One possible explanation for this could be that, "in the real world," we
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are not taught to look at the amount of our expenses and then select the type of
pay system. Generally, people budget expenses based on their income. Since the
amount of expenses were calculated as a percentage of total pay, subjects may
have tried to maximize their simulated earnings by experimenting with the pay
types, thus producing variability in their responses.
Subject 4 in Experiment 1 demonstrated the importance o f this type of
assay for investigating the factors that may be associated with preference or
"satisfaction" with pay systems. As stated earlier, many question the use of selfreport measures (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Lockhart, 1979). Often, how
people report they will respond is quite different than their actual behavior. On the
self-report questionnaire, Subject 4 responded that "boredom had influenced
responding." However, as can be seen from the data, Subject 4 responded in the
same manner as Subjects 1, 2, and 3, further verifying the importance of not
relying solely on self-report data.
There are certain limitations associated with this study and with this form
of research in general. It is important to consider that a person’s selection of a
certain pay type, given certain contrived variables, does not necessarily mean they
are more "satisfied" with that pay system. Money is a powerful generalized
conditioned reinforcer that may in the short run control more behavior than other
factors. It may be that subjects are more satisfied with one type of pay system, yet
when given the option of selecting a compensation system to work under, they
select the system with the greatest payoff. If they were actually to work under the
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two pay types in this study for an extended period of time, they may actually
prefer a pay system different than the one selected under these simulated
conditions.
Also, it must be stressed that the data collected were in a laboratory setting
and therefore may not generalize to "real world" work settings. Undergraduate
students serving as subjects may not reliably represent the general work population.
Although undergraduate college students have financial responsibilities, they are
seldom of the same magnitude o f those that beset individuals with families and
children. Further, this is a laboratory simulation, not a real work condition.
Subjects may respond entirely different if their actual means of support were at
risk or they were performing a repetitive task on a full-time basis.
For others who may be interested in this line of research, three suggestions
are offered.
1. Keep the simulation as simple as possible. The more complex the
simulation the harder it is to determine what is controlling responding.
2. Be sure to demonstrate stable responding under a given set of conditions,
then manipulate one variable at a time. In other words, be very concerned with
the design of your study.
3. Be careful in the selection of subjects. If needed, develop a test to
determine if possible subjects have the skills and knowledge needed to understand
the variables associated with the simulation. Simulations may be a viable means
of investigating the factors that may influence subject preference for certain pay
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systems, but they are not necessarily sensitive or ecologically valid measures of
behavior.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix A
Incentive Simulation Quiz

49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
Incentive Simulation Quiz
1.

What is 75% of $100.00?__________

2.

What is 50% of $250.00?__________

3.

Fifty dollars i s

4.

Seventy-five dollars i s _______ % of $150.00.

5.

If you earn $100.00, and if you spend 50% of this, how much would you
spend?_________

6.

If you earn $125.00, and 20% of this total pay goes toward expenses, how
much would you owe in expenses?__________

7.

Assume you are in a job and are being paid based on how well you
perform. The total amount that you can expect to earn is referred to as
your total expected earnings. If your total expected earnings is $500.00,
and you owe 95% of your total expected earnings in expenses, how much
do you o w e?______

% of $200.00.
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Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008-3899
616387-8293

W e s t e r n M i c h ig a n U n iv e r s it y

Date:

September 21, 1994

To:

Stephen Sundby

y

From: Richard Wright, Interim C h a i/ / ! > ''
Re:

HSIRB Project Num ber 94-08-10

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled " Evaluation of a computer
simulation to assess subject preference for different types of incentive pay" has b een a p p ro v e d
under the f u l l categoty of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The
conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan
University. You m ay now begin to implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you m ust seek specific approval for any changes in this design. You m ust also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you
should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:
xc:

Sept. 21. 1995

Poling, PSY
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Western Michigan University, Department of Psychology
Evaluation of a Computer Simulation to Assess Subject Preference
for Different Types of Incentive Pay: Part Two
Alan Poling and Stephen Sundby
Informed Consent for Participation in a Research Study
My name is Stephen Sundby and I am a graduate student in the Department of
Psychology at Western Michigan University. You are being invited to participate
in an experiment that will fulfill my dissertation requirement for a Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Applied Behavior Analysis. The purpose of this study is to
investigate the feasibility of using a computer simulation to determine worker
preference for various types of pay systems.
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to attend three sessions that last
approximately two hours each, and to work with a computer. The computer will
be running a program that will simulate a financial pay situation. During the
simulation, you will be asked to select from various payment schedules given
certain financial variables.
There are no apparent benefits for participation, except the $30 in compensation
you will receive upon completion of the three experimental sessions.
There are no apparent risks to you. However, As in all research, there may be
unforeseen risks to the participant. If an accidental injury occurs, appropriate
emergency measures will be taken; however, no compensation or treatment will be
made available to the subject except as otherwise stated in this consent form.
All information obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential. When the
results are presented, no one will be able to identify you. A number will be
randomly assigned to you and this number will be used when referring to your
data. By signing this informed consent, you will be giving permission for data
obtained in this study to be used in my dissertation and in professional
presentations and publications.
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may discontinue
participation in the experiment at any time without repercussions. Your
participation or withdrawal will not affect grades in any of your classes.
If you have any questions concerning this study, please contact me at 387-4503.
Dr. Alan Poling, the faculty advisor for the study, may be contacted at 387-4483.
The participant may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects Institutional Review
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Board (387-8293) or the Vice President for Research (387-8298) if questions or
problems arise during the course of the study.
YOUR SIGNATURE BELOW INDICATES THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE
ABOVE INFORMATION AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY.
You should keep the attached copy of this form.

Participant Signature

Date
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Calculations used to obtain Total Simulated Pay.
E xperim ent 1 (C ondition 1-High Incentive Pay)
Simulated Hourly Pay:
+

(0.50*500)
Low Prod.

*4
Weeks

2000

(0.50*1100) *4
High Prod
Weeks

4000

(0.50*500)
High Prod.

Simulated Base Pay Plus Incentive:
(0.50*900)
Low prod.

+

E xperim ent 1 (C ondition 2-High H ourly Pay)
Simulated Hourly Pay:
(0.50*1000) +
Low Prod.

(0.50*1000) *4
High Prod.
Weeks

4000

Simulated Base Pay Plus Incentive:
(0.50*450)
Low prod.

+

(0.50*550)
High Prod

*4
Weeks

2000

E xperim ents 2 an d 3
Simulated Hourly Pay:
(0.50*500)
Low Prod.

+

(0.50*500)
High Prod.

*4
Weeks

2000

*4
Weeks

2000

Simulated Base Pay Plus Incentive:
(0.50*375)
Low prod.

+

(0.50*625)
High Prod
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PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS CLOSELY!

PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to investigate the feasibility of using a simulation to
determine worker preference for various pay systems.
MAIN TASK
The computer simulation will guide you with prompts
throughout the session. The FINANCIAL STATEMENT SCREEN will display the
appropriate keys for you to press to access vital information.
Assume you are working as an assembly line worker for a major automobile
manufacturer and you receive your pay every week. Your pay consist of base pay
that you receive regardless of performance and incentive pay that can be earned
when you perform above average. YOUR MAIN TASK W ILL BE TO SELECT
THE TYPE OF INCENTIVE PAY EITHER HOURLY (0%) OR BASE PAY
PLUS INCENTIVE THAT YOU WANT IN EFFECT. You can determine the
amount of simulated pay for each performance level by pressing the appropriate
key at the Financial Statement Screen and looking at the pay table. You may look
at the pay table as often as you like.
Simulated pay will be placed in an account until time to pay simulated monthly
expenses. You will be prompted by the computer to select the pay system at the
beginning of the simulation and thereafter every three simulated month.
SIMULATED WORK PERFORMANCE
There are two simulated work performance levels: low and high. Your simulated
work performance will be determined by a number selected by the computer. This
number will correspond with either low or high simulated work performance. A
number will be selected for each simulated week and your simulated work
performance will be displayed on the Financial Statement Screen.
SIMULATED EXPENSES
After four simulated weeks you will have to pay your monthly expenses which
consist of fixed expenses and variable expenses. You can look at the amount of
simulated expenses by pressing the appropriate key listed on the Financial
Statement Screen. The fixed expenses remain constant while the variable expenses
change. The payment of these expenses will be performed by the computer and
displayed to you on the Financial Statement Screen. If you have more expenses
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than simulated funds available then you will receive a loan at 20% interest to pay
the simulated expenses.
YOUR COMPENSATION
Your monetary compensation for completing the study will be $30 ($10 for
Experiment 3).
PLAY MONEY
Please remember that all money associated with the computer simulation is PLAY
MONEY!
DEMONSTRATION
There will be a demonstration phase of the program prior to your beginning.
During the demonstration you will be required to press a key to continue. Please
pay close attention to the monetary amounts and operation of the simulation during
the demonstration phase. PLEASE ASK THE EXPERIMENTER IF YOU DO
NOT UNDERSTAND ANY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OR IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIMULATION?
PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIM E AND DO THE BEST YOU CAN!
THE DEMONSTRATION W ILL BEGIN WHEN YOU EXIT!
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FINANCIAL STATEMENT SCREEN
Pay Type: HOURLY PAY

Expense Percentage: 95%

Your performance for week
Your Pay for Week

1

1

was HIGH.

= $ 500

Current Savings = * 500

COMMANDS:

<P>ay Table

OR

<N>ext Week

PRESS ONE OF THE KEYS IN BRACKETS!

Os

to

Appendix G
After Session Questionnaire

63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A fter Session Questionnaire
1.

A t anytime did anyone other than the experimenters talk to you about the
experimental conditions o f this study?
YES
NO

2.

Did you understand the expense conditions?
YES
NO

3.

Did you understand the incentive conditions?
YES
NO

4.

Did boredom influence your responses?
YES
NO
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